Regarding "racial profiling," see UNITED STATES V. ARVIZU

Considering the totality of the circumstances and giving due weight to the factual inferences drawn by Stoddard and the District Court Judge, Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that respondent was engaged in illegal activity. Because the “balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security,” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot,” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7. In making reasonable-suspicion determinations, reviewing courts must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417—418. This process allows officers to draw on their own experiences and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available. Id., at 418.

This was a unanimous decision by the US Supreme Court, reversing a decision by the 9th Circuit Court. The particulars are:

Respondent was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A search of his vehicle revealed more than 100 pounds of marijuana, and he was charged with possession with intent to distribute. The Federal District Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, citing a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

Stoddard saw a set of factors that let him to believe he had probable cause not only to stop the vehicle, but to search it. Arizona courts upheld the probable cause. The 9th Circuit determined that since each of the individual factors had an "innocent" explanation, there was no probable cause. The Supreme Court held that the stop and search were legal and Constitutional because the measure of the legitimacy of the stop is the totality, not the merit of any single factor.

Part of this stemmed from United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, where the Supreme Court (in the 70's) upheld a traffic stop made in part, and among other reasons, because the driver was Hispanic! Egads, "racial profiling." But no, because it's a portion of the profile, not the sum and total (as I've said before).

In other words, the very profiling that assorted Arab groups (as well as assorted "civil rights" groups) groan, moan, whine, bitch, sue, complain, etc., about are legal and constitutional and have been repeatedly upheld. Obviously some whiners need an education, and law enforcement officials need to get to work.